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WHEN DOES SELECTION FAVOR LEARNING FROM THE OLD?
SOCIAL LEARNING IN AGE-STRUCTURED POPULATIONS
DOMINIK DEFFNER AND RICHARD MCELREATH
Abstract. Culture and demography jointly facilitate flexible human adaptation, yet it still
remains unclear how social learning operates in populations with age structure. Specifi-
cally, how do demographic processes affect the adaptive value of culture, cultural adapta-
tion and population growth and when does selection favor copying the behavior of older
vs. younger individuals? Here, we develop and analyze a mathematical model of the evo-
lution of social learning in a population with different age classes. We find that adding
age structure alone does not resolve Rogers’ paradox, i.e. the finding that social learning
can evolve without increasing population fitness. Cultural transmission in combination
with demographic filtering, however, can lead to much higher adaptation levels. This is
because by increasing proportions of adaptive behavior in older age classes, demographic
filtering constitutes an additional adaptive force that social learners can benefit from.
Moreover, older age classes tend to have higher proportions of adaptive behavior when
the environment is relatively stable and adaptive behavior is hard to acquire but confers
large survival advantages. Through individual-based simulations comparing temporal and
spatial variability in the environment, we find a “copy older over younger models”-strategy
only evolves readily when social learning is erroneous. The opposite “copy the younger”-
strategy is adaptive when the environment fluctuates frequently but still maintains large
proportions of social learners. Our results demonstrate that age structure can substan-




When should individuals copy the behavior and norms of older generations? In her 1970 book
“Culture and Commitment”, anthropologist Margaret Mead considered relations between genera-
tions based on the prevalent rate of social change [1]. When this rate is slow, juveniles grow up in
an environment that resembles that of their parents and older generations serve as valued models5
and authorities. Under such circumstances being old may signal adaptive behavior as one has man-
aged to survive to old age. In so called gerontocratic societies, which include the Ancient Greek
city state of Sparta and contemporary East-African pastoralists such as the Kenyan Samburu [2; 3],
social stratification is predominantly based on age-classes and opinions of older individuals tend to
be highly valued. When societal change is more rapid, on the other hand, being old may predict10
being out of date as relevant environmental conditions may have changed since older generations
have acquired their norms and behaviors. Starting in the 1960s, attitudes associated with older
generations are often seen as backward and outdated in Western societies (“OK Boomer” is a recent
example) and young individuals regularly attend to their peers instead. Which demographic and
cultural factors could explain these opposing views on the value of information provided by older15
individuals?
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Children across societies need to learn many essential skills to become competent adult members
of their communities. The transmission and gradual modification of cultural information over gen-
erations is often considered key to human evolutionary success as it allows us to flexibly adjust to
vastly different environments through locally adapted tools, beliefs and institutions [4; 5; 6]. Past20
theoretical work has investigated the conditions that favor the evolution of social learning and the
way individuals should combine individual and social information strategically [7; 8; 9].
One starting point was Alan Rogers’ equally simple and elegant model that demonstrates how
pure social learning does not increase mean population fitness because its adaptive value is strongly
frequency-dependent [10]. With few other social learners, chances are high to copy an individual25
learner, who has learned from direct interactions with the environment, providing adaptive informa-
tion without costly trial-and-error learning. As the proportion of social learners increases, fewer and
fewer individuals track the state of the environment, which can result in maladaptive information
cascades [11]. At equilibrium, there tends to be a mix of individual and social learners that have the
same mean fitness as a population entirely comprised of individual learners, an observation termed30
“Rogers’ paradox” in the literature.
This and most following models omit age structure and study the evolution of learning in popu-
lations with discrete, non-overlapping generations. Individuals are assumed to be born, learn from
the previous generation, reproduce and then all die at the same time. Call this the “annual grass
model” of culture. Social learning and life history, however, interact in human adaptation and we35
need further modeling work that incorporates age structure and different population dynamics [12].
Age structure is an undeniable feature of human (and other animal) populations, can have profound
consequences for evolutionary dynamics [13; 14] and is also expected to shape the informational
environment learning is responding to. Thus, to address when juveniles should learn from older
generations but also how culture facilitates human adaptation in general, we need a formal theory40
of the evolution of social learning in age-structured populations.
The goal in this paper is to develop the simplest possible model of the classic adaptive value of
culture, but in an age-structured population. So call this, “Rogers’ model with age classes”. As such,
it isn’t meant to represent any specific organism. Rather it represents the structure of an argument.
How do demographic and cultural forces affect adaptation and population growth? And what are the45
minimal conditions for such forces to make it worthwhile to copy older individuals? We first formulate
a mathematical model of the population and learning dynamics and demonstrate that adding age
does not resolve Rogers’ paradox but can lead to more social learning and higher adaptation levels.
We then solve for the conditions that favor learning from older vs. younger individuals. Finally, we
confirm and extend the analytical results through individual-based simulations and investigate how50
age-biased social learning evolves in temporally and spatially varying environments.
2. The model
Consider a large population of perennial organisms that live in a temporally varying environment.
The environment can take on one of a very large number of states. Each state has a corresponding
adaptive response. An adaptive response may increase both survival and fertility of adults. The en-55
vironment may change with probability u each time step, rendering all previously adaptive behavior
non-adaptive.
Individuals are born as juveniles who cannot yet reproduce, but may learn about the environment.
After one time step, a juvenile who survives transitions to adulthood. Adults do not learn, but do
reproduce. Let sj be the probability of survival of a juvenile or an adult who practices response60
j, where j = 1 indicates adaptive behavior and j = 0 indicates non-adaptive behavior. Let bj be
the fertility of an adult with the adaptive response. Juveniles have zero fertility always. They must
survive once to have any chance of producing descendants.
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The organism’s challenge is to find the currently adaptive response. Juveniles may learn either
socially or individually. Social learners sample two models and then may choose among them based65
upon relative age. Individual learners instead reduce their probability of survival to adulthood by a
factor c < 1 for a chance z of innovating an adaptive response to current conditions.
2.1. Recursions. The state of the population is given by the state variables nij , where i is an age
class and j = 1 indicates an individual with adaptive response. The number of juveniles n10 (all are
born non-adapted) is regenerated each time period by fertility from all adult age classes:70












where p is the probability a juvenile acquires currently adaptive response through learning. We
define p as a function of heritable strategy in the next section. The number in each adult age class
i > 1 is given instead by:
n ′i0 = s0ni−1,0 + us1ni−1,1(3)
n ′i1 = (1− u)s1ni−1,1(4)
Since adults do not learn in this model, these recursions are very simple. However, when the
environment changes with probability u, all adapted adults are rendered forever non-adapted. There75











The symbol π gives the probability of individual learning and is further defined in the next section.
2.2. Learning. Let p be the probability a juvenile acquires currently adaptive behavior. We define
this as a function of a strategy vector {π, φ}, where π is the probability of individual learning and φ
determines the direction and strength of any bias for age of model to socially learn from. Specifically:80
p(π, φ) = πz + (1− π)Q(φ)(7)
where z is the probability an individual learner acquires adaptive behavior. Q is a function for
the probability of acquiring adaptive response by social learning. We define φ as the proportional
odds of copying the older of two individuals. Let R be the probability of copying the older of two






yielding R = φ/(φ + 1). To compute Q, we need to average over the possible pairs of social
models. Let qi be the proportion of individuals in age class i with adaptive behavior. Let ai be
the proportion of adults (i > 1) in age class i. Then the probability a juvenile acquires adaptive
behavior through social learning is:



















In the above expression, the first summation is all pairs with tied ages. In these pairs, there is no90
age asymmetry. So the learner imitates at random and acquires adaptive response when a random
individual of age class i has an adaptive response. In the second summation, the double one, we sum
over asymmetric pairs where an individual in age class i is older than one in age class j. There is a
probability 2aiaj of such a pair, allowing for both orderings, and then the learner acquires adaptive
response according to which model is imitated and whether an individual of that age class has an95






3.1. Does adding age structure resolve Rogers paradox? As a first step, we investigate
whether age structure resolves “Rogers’ paradox”, the finding that social learning can invade a
population of individual learners without increasing mean population fitness. We compare a base-100
line model with discrete, non-overlapping generations (i.e. the original Rogers model) to the age-
structured learning model described above. For this analysis, we assume individual learning always
produces adaptive behavior (i.e. z = 1) and social learners copy adults randomly (i.e. φ = 1).
Relaxing these assumptions does not change the results. Fig. 1 shows proportions of social learners
(Fig. 1A,B) and fitness (i.e. lineage growth rate at equilibrium, λ, Fig. 1C,D) for the original Rogers105
model and the age-structured version. In both models, social learning evolves more readily as in-
dividual learning is more costly and the environment changes less frequently. Lines in Fig. 1C,D
represent mean fitness in populations with social learners, points give corresponding values in popu-
lations of only individual learners. Fitness in both models is determined by the fitness of individual
learners and does not change with the introduction of social learners. Age structure, thus, does110
not resolve Rogers paradox. As a direct consequence of age structure and the assumption that only
juveniles learn, fitness in the age-structured model decreases as the environment becomes more vari-
able: With discrete generations, the whole population gets replaced each time step, so that fitness
of individual learners does not depend on environmental stability. With age structure, individual
learners can lose adaptive behavior during their lifetime through environmental change, resulting in115
the decline in population fitness.
3.2. Demographic filtering and its interplay with social learning. Next, we investigate the
interplay between social learning and demography and their joint effect on adaptation. With viability
selection, i.e. differential chances of survival, the demographic filtering of adaptive behavior in older
age classes might constitute a second adaptive force in addition to individual learning that social120
learners could benefit from.
Individual Learning only. We start with a population of only individual learners and compare
the behavior of the model with a stochastically changing environment under pure fecundity and
pure viability selection. Fig. 2A illustrates the effect of demographic filtering on the distribution of
adaptive behavior across age classes. If there is no survival advantage to adaptive behavior (solid125
line), older age classes will always have lower proportions of adaptive behavior as environmental
change periodically renders their behavior out of date. If being adapted confers survival benefits
(dashed line), only those possessing adaptive behavior will be likely to survive to certain ages making
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Figure 1. Proportions of social learners (A,B) and mean population fitness (C,D, lineage
growth rate at equilibrium, λ) conditional on the rate of environmental change u and the
cost of individual learning c. Results for the original Rogers model with discrete, non-
overlapping generations are shown on the left, results for the age-structured model with
overlapping generations on the right. Lines in plots C and D represent populations with
social learners, points give corresponding values for populations of only individual learners.
Other parameter values were: z = 1, φ = 1, b0 = 1, b1 = 1.5, s0 = 0.9, s1 = 0.9.
age a predictor of adaptive behavior. The probability that an adult in age class i possesses adaptive
behavior can be calculated as follows:130
PAdapt,i = (1− u) i−1
s i−11 z




A first prerequisite is that the environment has not changed since an individual has learned which
is given by the first part of the equation. This term is multiplied by the relative probability adults
have acquired adaptive behavior as juveniles and survived up to age i. Fig. S1 in the ESM plots
resulting curves for different values of u, σ = s0/s1, and z. Expectedly, more rapid changes in
the environment result in lower values and earlier peaks of adaptive behavior. Stronger viability135
selection leads to earlier peaks in adaptive behavior, as even surviving to younger ages indicates
being adapted when selection acts strongly on chances of survival. Resulting from such filtering,
populations under viability selection reach higher adaptation levels compared to fecundity selection,
but still plateau at a value determined by the success rate of individual learning as adaptive filtering
cannot affect juvenile learning (Fig. 2C).140
Individual and Social Learning. Now we also let social learners evolve. Demographic filtering
increases the adaptive value of culture and leads to substantially higher frequencies of social learners
in the population (means of 98% and 38% for viability and fecundity selection, respectively). By
increasing proportions of adaptive behavior in older age classes, demographic filtering improves the
quality of social information and thereby results in more copying among juveniles. As social learn-145
ing effectively drains accumulated adaptive information from older age classes, it lowers the peak
6 DEFFNER AND MCELREATH
Figure 2. Proportions of social learners per age (A,B) and proportion of adapted in-
dividuals per time after an environmental change (C,D). Results for populations with
only individual learners are shown on the left, results for populations comprising both
individual and social learners on the right. Solid lines represent dynamics under fecun-
dity selection (i.e. without demographic filtering), dashed lines represent dynamics un-
der viability selection (i.e. with demographic filtering). Results are shown for z = 0.5
which is also indicated by the dotted horizontal line in the bottom. Other parameter
values were chosen to keep mean fitness constant at λ ≈ 1.20 across different scenarios:
u = 0.01, c = 0.01, φ = 1, b0 = 0.35, b1 = 0.5, s0 = 0.85, s1 = 0.93.
in adaptive behavior (Fig. 2B). After an environmental shock (Fig. 2D), populations under viabil-
ity selection take relatively long to recover because few individual learners track the state of the
environment. Without filtering, populations recover faster but are limited to the adaptation levels
individual learners can obtain, as innovation is the only adaptive force in the system. With viability150
selection, adaptation levels exceed those of individual learners and increase until the whole popula-
tion is adapted. Combining demographic filtering and social learning, the accumulated benefits of
adaptive filtering can feed back on juveniles resulting in an adaptive interplay between cultural and
demographic forces that enables much higher adaptation levels.
3.3. When are older individuals better adapted? After considering the general impacts of age155
structure, we now turn to our primary question: When will selection favor a positive (φ > 1) or
negative (φ < 1) age bias? To address this question, we require expressions for the qi state variables,
the proportion of each age class i with adaptive behavior. Specifically, we would like to know, under
a separation of genetic and demographic time scales, the demographic environment that selection
of φ responds to. This means we seek expressions for the steady state q̂i values corresponding to a160
stable age distribution.
Since this model contains no population regulation, the population will either increase to infinity
or decline to zero (see [12] for effect of population regulation on social learning). We are interested
in the former case. In that case, the frequency of individuals in each age-and-behavior class ij
will eventually stabilize, even though the number of individuals in the population will continue to165
WHEN DOES SELECTION FAVOR LEARNING FROM THE OLD? 7
grow. Therefore we analyze the frequencies f̂ ij = nij/N that define the stable age-and-behavior
distribution. These frequencies are defined by the recurrence equations in the previous section,
normalized by N . This normalization introduces a population growth adjustment. To see this,






















(1− u)s1 f̂ i−1,1(14)





(1− u)s1 f̂ i−1,1 =
1
λ
(1− u)s1 f̂ i−1,1(15)





s0 f̂ i−1,0 + us1 f̂ i−1,1
)
(16)
Note that when the population grows slowly, due to density-dependent regulation of fertility, for175
example, then λ ≈ 1. This is a very common assumption in much life history analysis. But we
will attempt to keep λ general, in case some further insights about the value of learning arise from
the generality. Since much of human cultural evolution was spent in expanding populations, this
generality is not irrelevant. These equations can be solved explicitly, yielding formulas in terms of
only initial conditions and parameters. For i > 1:180
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These were solved using the honorable Ansatz method, but Mathematica confirms the solutions
via RSolve. The stable proportion of individuals at age i with adaptive behavior is defined as:
q̂i =
f̂ i,1
f̂ i,1 + f̂ i,0
(19)
This expression depends implicitly upon p̂, the stable probability that a juvenile acquires adaptive
behavior. But p̂ depends in turn upon the q̂i values. This does not stop our inferential progress
(yet), because we do not need to determine p̂ at steady state. We just need to use it implicitly in185
our solution. Specifically, note that the expressions for n ′1,1 and n
′
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Figure 3. Threshold value of p̂, as defined by expression 24. Each curve shows the
threshold p̂ for a different value of u. Areas underneath the curves indicate parameter












1(s0 − s1(1− u))(1− u) i
s i0s1(1− u)(us1 − (1− p)(s1 − s0))− ps0(s1 − s0)s i1(1− u) i
(22)
We also have the above expression for general λ, but it is very messy.
Now we can ask when q̂i > q̂i−1, yielding the condition (again for λ ≈ 1):
p̂ < 1− u s1
s1 − s0
(23)
Or equivalently, letting σ = s0/s1:
p̂ < 1− u
1− σ
(24)
This is the condition for older age classes to have larger proportions of adaptive behavior and190
therefore the precondition for selection to favor φ > 1. Neither copying the old nor the young
is always beneficial. Rather, whether or not older individuals are better adapted depends upon
a balance of forces. The force of environmental change u is to reduce the proportion of adaptive
behavior in older age classes—as u increases, the condition above becomes increasingly difficult to
satisfy. The force of a survival advantage to adaptive behavior, in contrast, is to increase adaptive195
behavior in older age classes. As σ decreases, corresponding to a larger advantage to adaptive
behavior, the condition is easier to satisfy.
The condition above confirms the intuition behind the model. This is useful, because intuition
is often—if not usually—wrong. But it also provides quantitative guidance on the relative strength
of these forces. In Figure 3, we plot the threshold value of p̂ across all possible values of σ, for200
different values of u. The region below each curve corresponds to combinations of p̂ and σ that lead
to older age classes having higher proportions of adaptive behavior. When environments change
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Figure 4. Proportions of social learners (top) and old bias (bottom) for the temporal (left)
and spatial (right) individual-based model. Lighter colors indicate higher proportions,
darker colors lower proportions. Results are shown for c = 0.05, z = 0.5, s1 = 0.9, µ =
0.005.
very rapidly, the adaptive behavior must be hard to acquire for a juvenile and must provide large
survival benefits for older individuals to be better adapted. On the other hand, when environments
are very stable, the above condition is almost always fulfilled, so that juveniles should copy older205
individuals irrespective of other factors.
3.4. The evolution of age-biased social learning in temporally and spatially varying en-
vironments. Juveniles should be more likely to copy the older of two individual if the environment
is relatively stable, adaptive behavior is hard to acquire and there is a large survival advantage
to adaptive behavior. Which of these forces is strongest depends not only on their parameters,210
σ = s0/s1 and u, but also on the frequency of adaptive behavior in the population. To confirm and
extend the analytical results, we construct and analyze a stochastic individual-based version of the
model and explore how readily age-biased social learning evolves in both temporally and spatially
varying environments (see ESM for simulation details).
Fig. 4 shows proportions of social learners and those biased towards older individuals (“Old Bias”)215
for both the temporal (left) and spatial model (right). Lighter colors indicate higher proportions.
In the temporal model, social learning evolves when the environment is relatively stable or there is
very little advantage to possessing adaptive behavior. Intriguingly, there are no regions in parameter
space that clearly favor copying the old. Instead, when the environment changes frequently (but
not rapidly enough to favor large numbers of individual learners), evolution favors a pronounced220
“copy-the-young” bias. In the spatial model, high proportions of social learning can also occur with
much more unstable environments (i.e. high migration rates) in simulations with strong viability
selection. This is because selection weeps out non-adaptive variation brought in by migrants, such
that most group members possess adaptive behavior. Here, selection favors a slight “copy-the-old”
bias in regions with stable environments and/or large advantages to adaptive behavior, as predicted225
by the analytical model.
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While u and σ are parameters that we can directly manipulate, p̂, the third variable in expression
24, arises endogenously from different interacting forces within the model. The reason no stronger
“copy-the-old” bias can evolve in either model, is that in stable environments with large benefits
to adaptive behavior (conditions that would favor old bias), essentially everyone will be adapted,230
so either social learning strategy will result in adaptive behavior and there is a strong ceiling effect
on demographic filtering. So far, we have assumed there is no copying error, i.e. learners can
perfectly reproduce the behavior they observe in a model. This is a rather strong assumption and
in reality there might be many circumstances where juveniles fail to acquire a trait through social
learning. Fig. S2 in the ESM shows the results for simulations where social learning results in the235
successful adoption of adaptive behavior in only 70% of learning events. By lowering p̂, this slight
modification leads to the evolution of large proportions of “copy-the-old” bias in both the temporal
and spatial model. When social learning is imperfect, there is room for demographic filtering to
increase proportions of adaptive behavior in older age classes making them preferable models.
Finally, we calculate p̂ from simulation results and plot it with the proportion of old bias for240
different values of u and σ. Fig. S3 in the ESM shows that individuals are less likely to copy
older individuals when it is relatively easy to acquire adaptive behavior as a juvenile as implied by
expression 24. This holds for different combinations of u and σ.
4. Discussion
Culture and demography jointly facilitate flexible human adaptation, yet most previous models245
decided to leave out demographic complexity and studied the evolution of learning and cultural
dynamics in isolation. Making simplifying assumptions is of course important but even relatively
basic questions, such as “When should juveniles learn from older individuals?”, cannot be answered
or even formally asked unless age structure is taken into account. Here we develop and analyze the
age-structured version of Rogers’ model of the adaptive value of culture [10] and ask under which250
conditions juveniles should preferentially attend to older vs. younger individuals. As such, our
model also omits a good deal of real-world complexity. The goal of theoretical modeling is not to
approximate the natural world as closely as possible but to isolate the fundamental structure of an
overly complex reality and apply formal logic to deduce the basic causal forces [15; 16; 17].
First, we found that adding age structure does not resolve Rogers’ paradox. In populations with255
age classes pure social learning still does not increase mean population fitness compared to individual
learners alone. Theory has shown that for culture to increase population fitness, it must make
individual learning either more accurate or less costly [18]. [19], for instance, showed that a strategy
of “critical social learning”, where individuals switch to individual learning if social learning proves
unsatisfactory, outcompetes pure individual and social learning strategies (similarly for the reverse260
“conditional social leaning”). In the present model, age structure can increase the adaptive value
of culture, such that a population can maintain higher proportions of copying, but social learning
cannot increase the fitness of individual learners. As both types of learners must per definition
have the same fitness at equilibrium, social learning cannot increase mean population fitness. In a
stochastic model with spatial population structure, [20] found that under some circumstances pure265
social learning can increase average fitness. They also show that spatial structure can introduce
a new paradox with social learning spreading even when it decreases average fitness below that
of individual learners. Individuals in this model occupied different cells within a square toroidal
environment with both dispersal and learning occurring locally. This creates an “edge effect” where
social learners can spread because they have greater fitness in contact zones between genotypes (due270
to higher chances to copy individual learners), even though their average fitness is lower. Future
work should study the effects of different kinds of population structure and their interaction with
each other and cultural dynamics.
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Even though social learning did not increase mean population fitness, in combination with de-
mographic filtering it enabled the population to reach much higher adaptation levels. Demographic275
filtering increases proportions of adaptive behavior in older age classes and thus constitutes a sec-
ond adaptive force in addition to individual learning. While this source of adaptive information is
unavailable to populations of pure individual learners, social learners can utilize it by copying older
generations. Thereby, they can spread to higher frequencies and simultaneously increase adaptation
levels compared to situations without such filtering (i.e. pure fecundity selection). These higher280
adaptation levels are counteracted by longer recovery periods after environmental changes due to
less individual learners tracking the environment. Previous work has investigated how social learning
and culture help organisms adapt to changing environments, but cultural adaptation is intimately
related to the way organisms grow, reproduce and die [21; 22]. Humans show highly developed
abilities to learn from others, but we also exhibit a prolonged childhood and juvenile period, shorter285
intervals between births, and a significant post-reproductive lifespan. To explain how these conspic-
uous features might have coevolved with our unique reliance on culture, we need more modeling
work on the adaptive interplay between social learning and different life history dynamics [12].
Our primary question was when natural selection would favor learning from older vs. younger
individuals. This question has attracted considerable empirical attention [23], yet we still lack a290
principled theoretical framework to unify existing findings and generate new predictions. In devel-
opmental psychology, 15-month-olds were reported to be more likely to copy behaviors performed
by an adult versus a two-year-old child [24] and three- and four-year-olds preferentially attended to
information provided by an adult over a child in a object labelling task [25]. Studies also showed
that children faithfully copy both relevant and irrelevant actions demonstrated by adult models but295
only relevant actions demonstrated by children [26; 27]. Research in anthropology suggests that
hunter–gatherer social learning is primarily vertical under age 5 and oblique and horizontal between
the ages of 6 and 12 [28]. Taken together, these studies seem to imply that under most circum-
stances children preferentially attend to older generations. Our modeling results show that this can
be a good strategy, but only when the environment is relatively stable, adaptive behavior is hard to300
acquire and confers large survival advantages. Moreover, we found through simulation that due to
ceiling effects in adaptive behavior a “copy older over younger models” strategy can only reliably
evolve when social learners occasionally fail to copy adaptive behavior. The opposite “copy younger
over older models” strategy can be advantageous when the environment fluctuates frequently but
still maintains large proportions of social learners. Similar to our findings, the best strategies in the305
second round of the social learning strategies tournament copied both successful and young demon-
strators [29; 30]. Individuals in their simulations could update behavior throughout their lifetime, so
one might expect older individuals would be better adapted due to more learning opportunities. At
each point in time, individuals could either exploit known behaviors to obtain their rewards or learn
a new behavior. As a consequence, individuals mostly learned right after birth or after a change in310
the environment when they experienced a drop in payoffs. Because births were random with respect
to changes in the environment, juveniles were more likely to acquire adaptive behavior after birth
compared to adults learning when the environment has just changed. This shows that selection can
favor learning from the young as long as there is some exploration–exploitation trade-off between
investing in learning and reproduction and not only when learning is restricted to juveniles which315
represents the extreme form of this tradeoff.
In this paper, we developed and analyzed an age-structured model of the evolution of social
learning. Even in such simple models, we find intricate interactions between culture and demography
that change our understanding of how cultural organisms learn and adapt. We are just beginning
to understand how such joint culture-demography-systems might behave in general and further320
bodies of theory including strategic learning and cumulative culture are necessary to untangle the
coevolutionary relationships between demography and culture.
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Appendix (A) describes details of individual-based simulations and (B) shows fur-
ther results and illustrations.
A. Individual-based simulations
Temporal Variation. In the temporal model we consider a population of fixed size with
N = 1000 individuals. After birth, each juvenile engages in either individual or social
learning according to a dichotomous genotype. Individual learners acquire adaptive
behavior with probability z and pay a recruitment cost c. Social learners randomly
sample two interaction partners from the adult population and copy either the older
or younger one depending on an inherited learning strategy. Individuals acquire
adaptive behavior from an adapted interaction partner with probability 1−eSL, where
eSL represents the degree of copying error. All individuals survive to the next age
class with probability s0 (non-adapted) or s1 (adapted). We assume asexual, haploid
reproduction. All adults have an equal opportunity to give birth to an offspring to fill
one of the empty spots in the population (including fecundity selection does not affect
the results). Juveniles inherit the genotype governing learning strategies from their
parents with a small probability (µ = 0.005) of mutation for both loci. Each time
step, there is a probability u that the environment changes. When environmental
change occurs, all variants in the population become non-adaptive.
Spatial Variation. For the spatial model, we consider a population of fixed size
with N = 2000 individuals that are divided into 4 equal sub-populations linked by
migration. Life cycle and learning process are identical to the temporal model with the
only exception that instead of temporal variation, there is constant migration between
different habitats that differ in important respects such that each is characterized by a
different adaptive response. Specifically, per time step each adult has a probability m
to migrate into another habitat which results in a loss of adaptive behavior. Migration
is implemented in a way to keep group sizes constant.
Results for both models are averaged over the last 5000 time steps of 10 independent




Figure S1. Proportion of adaptive behavior conditional on age in population of individual
learners, as defined by expression 11, for different values of z (top row: z = 0.7, bottom
row: z = 0.1), σ (left: σ = 1, center: σ = 0.75, right: σ = 0.5) and u (solid: u = 0.001,
dashed: u = 0.01, dotted: u = 0.1.).
Figure S2. Proportions of social learners (top) and old bias (bottom) for the temporal
(left) and spatial (right) individual-based model with social learning error (eSL = 0.3).
Lighter colors indicate higher proportions, darker colors lower proportions. Results are
shown for c = 0.05, z = 0.5, s1 = 0.9, µ = 0.005.
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Figure S3. Results for temporal individual-based model. Proportions of old bias con-
ditional on p̂, the probability juveniles acquire adaptive behavior, for high (left), moder-
ate (middle) and low (right) environmental stability. Each point represents mean across
last 5000 timesteps of 10 independent 7000 timestep simulations per parameter combi-
nation. Colors/shapes indicate different values of σ, the survival advantage to adap-
tive behavior. In addition to u and σ, we also varied the cost of individual learning
(c = 0.05, c = 0.1, c = 0.2), the success rate of individual learning (z = 0.01, z = 0.5, z = 1)
and the error rate of social learning (eSL = 0, eSL = 0.1, eSL = 0.3). Lines represent best
linear fit.
